It has been proposed that mental experience in sleep, such as dreaming activity, both reflects and contributes to the off-line consolidation of recent episodic memories (e.g. Cipolli et al. 2004; De Koninck et al. 1990; Fiss et al. 1977; Wamsley & Stickgold 2011) . However, the mechanisms underlying a beneficial effect of sleep on memory consolidation through dreaming remain largely unknown. Llewellyn proposes that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming supports the "elaborate encoding" of episodic memories, eventually leading to the emergence of novel commonalities or associations between recent and remote memories that are then instantiated as "junctions" and consolidated during non-REM (NREM) sleep. We found Llewellyn's hypothesis sensible in considering synergetic roles for REM and NREM sleep in memory consolidation processes. Indeed, animal studies (Giuditta et al. 1995) and human studies (Ficca et al. 2000) suggest that information processing through consecutive iterations of NREM-REM sleep cycles plays a pivotal role in the off-line consolidation of recent memories.
In this respect, and as acknowledged by Llewellyn, several authors already ascribed complementary roles to the main sleep states. For instance, it was proposed that recent memories are protected against retroactive interference during NREM sleep and then consolidated during REM sleep (Scrima 1982) or at the molecular level that NREM slow-wave sleep (SWS) promotes post-acquisition processes of neuronal reverberation, whereas transcriptional events necessary for long-term memory consolidation are sparked during the subsequent REM sleep. Hence, converging data support the hypothesis of sequential processes of memory consolidation during sleep (Giuditta et al. 1995) . More generally, the selection of adaptive memory traces and the weakening of nonadaptive ones may predominate during NREM sleep, the selected memory traces being then consolidated during the immediately ensuing REM sleep episode.
Besides differences in conceptualizations, most proposals converge to suggest that the succession of cerebral states corresponding to a typical sleep cycle (i.e., NREM followed by REM sleep) influences the consolidation of recently learned information in long-term memory. In contrast with this prevailing view, Llewellyn argues that episodic memories are first processed during REM sleep and then consolidated during NREM sleep. This position raises several questions that would need to be addressed.
First, if it is true that episodic memories are elaborately encoded during REM dreaming and then consolidated as "junctions" during NREM sleep, it logically entails that REM sleepdependent memory processes would take place before those occurring during NREM sleep -that is, in the opposite order of sleep states within a cycle, which also assumes that the first NREM episode within a night of sleep might not play any role in the processing of memories. However, such a hypothesis is invalidated by the abundant literature ascribing a major role to the first NREM sleep episode in memory consolidation (e.g., Gais et al. 2000; Plihal & Born 1997; 1999; Yaroush et al. 1971) . Second, and within the continuity of the previous argument, the first sleep cycles in a night are proportionally the richer in NREM (SWS) sleep, whereas the last sleep cycles are the richer in REM sleep. Therefore, consolidation according to Llewellyn would predominantly occur during the first part of the night, whereas elaborative encoding would take place in the second half, again leading to the same logical contradiction.
Notwithstanding sleep physiology, we also found Llewellyn's proposal incongruent with the chronobiological characteristics of dreams production. Indeed, dream contents change as the night progresses: REM sleep mentation is more vivid, more emotional, and bizarre later in the night (Agargun & Cartwright 2003; Fosse et al. 2004; Verdone 1965; Wamsley et al. 2007 ). Because Llewellyn envisions these features of dream contents as reflections of elaborative encoding processes, elaborative encoding should occur during late REM sleep, thus leaving little time for NREM sleep processes to instantiate the so-called junctions.
Taken together, these elements question the roles attributed by Llewellyn to NREM and REM sleep states. While the succession of sleep stages may not be mandatory for memory consolidation processes (e.g., Scrima 1982), this interplay should be conceptualized and grounded in physiology whenever the differential actions of NREM and REM sleep follow an orderly sequence, as it is the case in Llewellyn's proposal.
Another key concept in Llewellyn's proposal is that novel associations between recent and remote memories are generated through dreaming activity during REM sleep. The evidence presented to us in support of this hypothesis is questionable. Indeed, Llewellyn mostly relies on studies by Wagner et al. (2004) and Walker et al. (2002) to infer a REM dreaming-related ability to create novel associative patterns. However, REM sleep was not specifically tested in the study by Wagner et al. (2004) , only the effect of a complete night of sleep deprivation. Furthermore, although Walker et al. (2002) found an association between REM sleep and improved ability in solving anagrams, the implicit rules extracted after a night of sleep were actually already present at encoding (also in Wagner et al. 2004) . Therefore, it is disputable whether these studies support the creation of de novo associations during sleep rather than the simple extraction of hidden patterns. Although activation of dopaminergic circuits during REM sleep may indeed favor dreaming and unusual associations (Perogamvros & Schwartz 2012) , it is probably more appropriate considering Wagner's and Walker's studies to suggest that (possibly REM) sleep facilitates insight into hidden rules, a process that leads to the construction of novel, higher-level schemas (Walker & Stickgold 2010) .
To conclude, Llewellyn's proposal has merits in proposing a synergetic role of sleep stages in memory processes. However, the proposal is also counterintuitive, considering the chronobiology of dreams and the architecture of sleep both within and between sleep cycles over the course of the night. It also remains disputable whether and how elaborative encoding processes would generate novel associations during sleep. Llewellyn's thorough description of rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming as elaborative encoding for episodic memories provides a convincing argument for the value of the ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles. Our commentary presents a complementary aspect of the dream, arguing that it is not solely "the stuff of memory," but also that of emotion regulation. Although her arguments lack an explicit link to the role of emotion in dreaming, Llewellyn does indirectly provide methods for understanding the process and purpose of emotion regulation in REM dreaming, which we explore in this commentary. The psychological models of dreaming suggest that dreams are constructed from one's emotional history and serve partly to regulate emotions, because the dreamer is forced to look, feel, and reprocess emotional memory. During a dream, the activation of the medial prefrontal cortex would play a role in the attribution of thoughts and emotions to oneself and to characters and situations of the dream, while the deactivation of the inferior parietal regions would enable the dreamer to experience the dream in the first-and third-person perspectives. This offline role-playing would facilitate the resolution of internal conflict, which some assimilate to an emotional catharsis (Desseilles et al. 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2012) .
During lucid dreams, as in the method of loci, the dreamer constructs the dream scene and participates in the action while simultaneously being an observer. The role of the dream scene could, in certain cases, be a task of memory, memorization, recollection, and association. As an Aristotelian catharsis (Desseilles et al. 2011a ), this theater-like staging could enable the dreamer to gain an outside perspective on certain behaviors, preoccupations, and problems present during wakefulness. Once lucid dreamers sufficiently identify, they could engage in mechanisms of regulation (functional or dysfunctional) of emotions, such a reappraisal, suppression, or rumination, without having to await wakefulness, as do nonlucid dreamers when they engage in the conscious regulation of emotions based on memories of dreams. The capacity of lucid dreamers to modify the course of their dreams could impact Llewellyn's theory, since she hypothesizes that following the elaborative encoding of recent memories with remote ones during REM dreams, the hippocampus may instantiate internal cortical junctions during non-REM sleep. Lucid dreamers could perhaps control elaborative encoding and thus change the quality of indexing, modifying the associations that could be recovered during wakefulness. The method of loci would therefore facilitate the regulation of emotions through an Aristotelian catharsis during the lucid dream (Zadra & Pihl 1997) by acting directly on the mnemonic composition and hippocampal indexes. This online aspect of mnemonic composition would suggest that the use of the method of loci during wakefulness (enabling a first-or third-person perspective), whether or not combined with the induction of a lucidity during dreams (Stumbrys et al. 2012) , could enable the dreamer subsequently to modulate more efficiently the emotional content associated with memories. The nonlucid dream would also play a cathartic role in emotion regulation, with REM sleep reducing the brain's reactivity to waking emotional experiences, simultaneously decreasing the intensity of previous affective experiences and diminishing subjective emotionality on the subsequent day (van der Helm et al. 2011b) .
Emotion regulation could also emerge from indexing, which enables a more practical and rapid return of detailed material and facilitates the processing of new material through its anchoring to remote memories. Unsuccessful indexing would therefore lead to a more difficult return to remote memories, which is what Llewellyn suggests, and to poor processing of the material, which would linger freely. The work of bonding and indexing is particularly important in traumatic memory and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), where the hypermemory of a traumatic event is present as much in dreams as in wakefulness. The recurrence of dreams linked to the traumatic event suggests that elaborative encoding and indexing are deficient. In fact, emotional hypersensitivity and endangerment of the self could inhibit elaborative encoding through hyperassociations to other memory episodes, leading to an absence of bonding. The traumatic memory episode remaining isolated and unassociated would thus not be indexed, reduced, and processed. The linking of the traumatic event would need to be carried out during wakefulness, for example by using imagery rehearsal therapy (Harb et al. 2012) , so as potentially to modify both elaborative encoding and indexing. In the context of PTSD, Roisin (2003; 2010) considers the exhortation of the desire to live as an essential action in the psychological growth of individuals having suffered a traumatic experience. When this desire resurfaces, post-traumatic symptoms disappear. Roisin therefore seems to link desire to elaborative encoding during wakefulness. Through its emotional salience, desire, like the dream, would contribute to emotional regulation.
Llewellyn's article suggests that we all have supermemorizer talents in our sleep, but not necessarily when awake. Explicit memorization that is largely superior to normal can be accompanied by emotional or social difficulties, like Asperger's syndrome of the autism spectrum (as in Daniel Tammet (Baron-Cohen et al. 2007) ), or like savant syndrome (as in Kim Peek (Treffert & Christensen 2005) ). Moreover, memorizers and individuals with Asperger's syndrome would not think of these AAOM rules (Tammet 2007) because they do not explicitly use them. Rather, the rules would function autonomously during wakefulness, as they do during sleep in the general population. Perhaps forgetting most of our dreams would serve to preserve our mental resources for surrounding stimuli during wakefulness, so as to not be distracted by our inner world. Therefore, could forgetting our dreams be necessary to our cognitive and emotional balance? If the AAOM enables the regulation of emotions through catharsis or indexing, should it remain predominantly nonconscious so as not to hinder social relations?
In addition to remaining at a level of implicit memorization, the use of the AAOM during REM sleep should increase with the quantity of information that confronts the individual. We could imagine that children highly exposed to new information would require increased processing in order to strengthen anchoring and increase their ability to remember. As we know that REM sleep is more predominant in infants (Marcus et al. 2008) , we could propose a developmental perspective on the necessity of assimilating a varying quantity of episodes (episodic memory) to retrieve. Thus, in addition to forgetting, the increase of anchoring in infants could be necessary to their cognitive and emotional development, particularly in the context of social relationships.
